Semnan University International Journal of Nonlinear Analysis and Applications 2008-6822 2025 09 19 Management of non-performing loans during the crisis using evolutionary game theory 10069 10.22075/ijnaa.2024.33178.4940 EN Zohreh Lashgari Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran Madjid Eshaghi Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran Alireza Bahiraie Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran Hamid Askari Harooni Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran Journal Article 2024 02 03 In this paper, we present a mathematical model based on the evolutionary game theory of the performance of banks, regulators and advisory committees on NPLs. This model can help banks control these loans in times of crisis so that they can make optimal decisions and identify and adjust the parameters affecting these decisions. This article is designed to provide guidelines for controlling non-performing loans (NPLs) during crises. Using evolutionary game theory, the game is presented between the bank, the regulators and the advisory committee to prevent the increase of this loan. The results show that by strengthening the presence of regulators and advisory committee and their effective supervision of the bank, it is possible to help control these loans in the context of the global crisis. In this paper, the parameters affecting NPLs using the evolutionarily stable strategy are shown. Also, by identifying and adjusting some of these parameters, suggestions for controlling these loans are presented. By controlling these types of loans in times of crisis, banks can invest in new activities and increase their growth and profitability. https://ijnaa.semnan.ac.ir/article_10069_ed750fafbda224343abd3fd7d90a7b57.pdf