International Journal of Nonlinear Analysis and Applications
Management of non-performing loans during the crisis using evolutionary game theory
Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran
Abstract
In this paper, we present a mathematical model based on the evolutionary game theory of the performance of banks, regulators and advisory committees on NPLs. This model can help banks control these loans in times of crisis so that they can make optimal decisions and identify and adjust the parameters affecting these decisions. This article is designed to provide guidelines for controlling non-performing loans (NPLs) during crises. Using evolutionary game theory, the game is presented between the bank, the regulators and the advisory committee to prevent the increase of this loan. The results show that by strengthening the presence of regulators and advisory committee and their effective supervision of the bank, it is possible to help control these loans in the context of the global crisis. In this paper, the parameters affecting NPLs using the evolutionarily stable strategy are shown. Also, by identifying and adjusting some of these parameters, suggestions for controlling these loans are presented. By controlling these types of loans in times of crisis, banks can invest in new activities and increase their growth and profitability.
Keywords
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Articles in Press, Corrected Proof
Available Online from 19 September 2025
- Receive Date: 03 February 2024
- Revise Date: 12 May 2024
- Accept Date: 09 June 2024