International Journal of Nonlinear Analysis and Applications

Determining the relationships between central bank transparency, bank-level characteristics (micro variables) and macroeconomic variables with the capital market reaction (in the context of systemic risk and market return changes) using econometric methods and hierarchical analysis

Articles in Press

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Management and Accounting, Kashan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Kashan, Iran

2 Department of Accounting, Faculty of Administrative and Economic Science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran

3 Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Financial Science, Management and Entrepreneurship, University of Kashan, Kashan, Iran

Abstract

This research evaluates the impact of central bank transparency on the reaction of the capital market in terms of risk and return. The study identifies systemic risk measures, dimensions of central bank transparency, and economic factors affecting the capital market reaction. It examines the relationship between central bank transparency and the reaction of the money and capital market in Iran and neighboring Islamic countries from 2008 to 2022. The study uses regression methods to investigate the relationship between central bank transparency and risk response. Findings show that increased central bank transparency is associated with reduced systemic risk and specific bank risk, but may also incentivize risky behavior in the banking sector.

Keywords

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International Journal of Nonlinear Analysis and Applications

Articles in Press, Corrected Proof
Available Online from 14 June 2026
  • Receive Date: 29 February 2024
  • Revise Date: 22 May 2024
  • Accept Date: 25 May 2024