Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Mehdi Fakhimi Kamran ¹
• Madjid Eshaghi Gordji ²
• Javad Hatami ³

¹ Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

² Department of Mathematics, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran

³ Psychology Department, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In the studies of human cooperation, the problem is always the choice between individual benefit and collective benefit, which is modeled by the game. On the other hand, based on the Dual processing of decision-making, whether cooperative decision-making is type I or type II has been discussed a lot. Some studies consider cooperative decision-making as type 1 and others as type 2. According to some theories, the human self is inter-subjective, and it is created by the interaction between I and Me. The classical model of game theory does not consider it. In this article, we first enter common sense and intersubjectivity into the game theory model and show that a level of estimation of the intention of the opposite player is necessary for cooperation. Then we show that if the individual perceives himself in a joint situation through the knowledge of the opposite player's intention, the cooperative decision-making process is carried out Fast, and therefore it must be considered type 1, and if he considers himself as an individual, his decision-making must be considered type 2. As a result, belonging to a social environment has priority over the type of decision-making.

Keywords

• reaction time
• human cooperation
• dual processing theory
• social cognition
• intentionality
• common sense