The effect of fair value accounting on the drops in stock prices of banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Department of Accounting, Rasht Branch, Islamic Azad University, Rasht, Iran

Abstract

This article examines the effect of fair value accounting and some other influential variables as control variables on the risk of dropping stock prices of banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2007-2021. The negative skewness coefficient of daily returns has been used to measure the risk of dropping stock prices of the company and used the formula of Hsu et al. [12] for fair value. The analysis of corporate financial information was performed by Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) in the Eviews software environment. The findings of the present study showed that fair value accounting had no significant effect on stock price drops not only in the short run but also in the long run.

Keywords

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Volume 12, Special Issue
December 2021
Pages 2315-2323
  • Receive Date: 16 October 2021
  • Revise Date: 27 November 2021
  • Accept Date: 11 December 2021